Abstract-Smartphones are widely used today and their popularity will certainly not slow down in the near future due to improved functionality and new technology improvements. Becoming more and more similar to PCs and laptops, they will also begin to face the same security problems especially in terms of network security. In a previous paper, we have provided a detailed analysis of security issues along with penetration test results for Windows Mobile 5.0 platform based smartphones. In this paper, we extend our vulnerability testing with two more smartphones, both based on the Symbian 9.1 OS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones combine the functionality of mobile phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). These types of devices are becoming increasingly popular in our daily life and decrease the need to carry several devices to get similar functionality. Almost all the latest Smartphones implement network technologies such as IEEE 802.11 (WLAN), Bluetooth, Infra-red and GSM/3G. When compared to regular phones, these devices have extra functionality and offer more services which will also make them more vulnerable. Many service providers also use Smartphones to quickly introduce new services to mobile users, often without really considering security. Security in these devices is often neglected due to too much attention given to the development and quick release of new functionality and services. As a result, smartphones are likely to be vulnerable both through their services and due to their relatively new and untested network stacks.
The work provided here contains a rather extensive penetration test against Symbian 9.1 OS Smartphones. Our testing has included fingerprinting, port scanning, and running exploit tools in order to test the different layers of the network stack. This type of analysis can never be complete but it is extensive enough to clearly show the easiness of how devices using Symbian 9.1 operating system can be attacked and rendered useless. This work is important for everyone who would like to use these devices in critical environments where hostile network traffic may be present.
Since most operators today use NAT for connections through GSM, GPRS, 3G, etc., it is not possible for attackers to directly scan and find the devices and the services they offer to the Internet in the way we have done here. This may change in the future, but at present, this offers some protection for the users. WLAN access, though, is different and the IP address being used on the WLAN may be accessible for users all over the Internet. In addition, attackers may also be able to spawn linklevel attacks against the devices via wireless access points.
When evaluating security, we should not only consider direct attacks against the Smartphone but also consider that it may be used as a bridge to connect to systems on different networks. It may, for example, be possible to reach corporate networks when a compromised Smartphone is used to bridge two networks together, a scenario which was shown in enterprise networks using Blackberry devices [1] .
Smart phones are used in many situations by professionals in situations where good and reliable communication is a key factor. Typical examples include voice and data communications during crisis management, for example as the only means for communication between rescue workers. It is therefore essential to know what level of stability, robustness and security these devices can provide. We don't want to see that a single malicious network packet from an attacker causes them to freeze, crash or enable attackers to install their own software on the devices. Similar penetration tests have been done against other systems, a very well-known example is Symantec's analysis of Windows Vista beta versions [2] , but this is, to our knowledge, the first extensive tests performed against Symbian-based Smartphone operating systems in order to test their stability, security and robustness.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous studies on Smartphone security have mainly focused on Windows Mobile's application layer security like MMS exploit, cross-service attacks, cracking mobile binaries using embedded reverse engineering, malware analysis and its protection against viruses, worms and Trojans. In some of the research papers, security investigations and comparisons have been done for different mobile operating systems, although they are all older versions. Security of mobile operating systems was investigated by Ahonen [3] and Kettula [4] in the year 2001 and 2000 respectively. Although the studies were based on the older version of OS platforms, these studies showed that most mobile operating systems lack important features like permission-based file access control, multi-user support and even memory protection. S. Perelson and R.A. Botha [5] have done a thorough investigation regarding access control of mobile devices in terms of different OS platforms. In 2006, Collin Mulliner [6] has given a detailed discussion of application level attacks which are possible to do against Smartphones. In his thesis he has demonstrated crossservice attacks and protection mechanisms, code execution vulnerabilities using MMS user agents and exploit creation against the Windows CE 4.2.X (Windows CE.NET) operating system. Also, several vulnerabilities related to Bluetooth were reported by Herfurt et al. [7] where they found that most problems were related to logic errors rather than buffer overflows and similar vulnerabilities. Mobile malware like worms, viruses and Trojans have been relatively common in the past years targeting well-known operating systems. The most widely used operating system, Symbian OS, faced multiple attacks of worms [8] [10] and Trojans [9] [11] . Also, Windows CE/Pocket PC systems are known to be targeted by viruses [12] and Trojans [13] .
In our previous paper [14] we have done a thorough analysis of the network stack in Smartphones based on Windows Mobile 5.0 Pocket PC edition, a system which is based on the Windows CE 5.0 platform. We followed a strict three-step methodology to analyze the stability of the network stack. Although the latest versions are Windows Mobile 6.1 [15] and 6.5 [16], their main difference is an improved user interface and both are still based on the Windows CE 5.0 platform. This analysis was an important first step in Smartphone operating system testing and it has also guided us about what to focus on when doing these tests of the Symbian-based platforms. These two papers also make it possible to do a comparative analysis of the different platforms with respect to their robustness and stability regarding network traffic.
In the next few sections, we will show the results from network scanning, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing of Symbian 9.1 based Smartphones.
III. PENETRATION TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Current desktop operating systems have been probed and tested with malicious traffic for quite some time and should be able to handle most well-known attacks quite effectively. On the other hand, smartphones are comparatively new devices with newly written network stacks, often suffering from space and memory constraints may therefore not be as good as its desktop counterparts to withstand these attacks. This has also proven to be true in our penetration tests where the devices actually crashed and behaved unpredictably during such tests. Finding completely new vulnerabilities no one has heard of before is very hard and the hacking communities are constantly trying to find new ways to abuse protocols. The best way to test systems is therefore to try most of the currently known attacks that have been problematic for conventional operating systems.
All tests are initiated from two clients, one running Windows XP and one Ubuntu Linux. The target were two smartphones (Sony Ericsson P990i and Nokia E61) running Symbian 9.1 OS. Wireshark [17], a well-known packet sniffing software was used to monitor the devices' responses. In the next few sections, results will be reported according to the test methodology described earlier in [14] .
A. Network scanning
In the network scanning performed, the Nmap "host discovery technique" [18] was used to find the MAC address and the IP address of the Smartphone and to find all open/filtered/closed ports on the device. This is a technique which may reveal services even if they are protected by a device's firewall or built-in security barrier, if present. Moreover, a fingerprinting technique was used to see if it was possible for an attacker to exactly identify the operating system running on the target, something which also enabled us to see more closely how close the system's behavior is to other operating systems (such as TTL, window size, initial sequence numbers, etc.). These tests gave several hints about the internal network stack architecture of the device and the services it offers. The detailed test results are given in Table I and Table II. In Table I and II, the intense scanning of TCP ports shows that the Sony Ericsson device has only one service running which is the Symbian service broker (symbian-sb port). The Symbian-sb port is used to determine OS version, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number and available services and their corresponding ports. In contrast, the Nokia device had no open ports.
By examining the results of the OS fingerprinting test from Table I and II and the Nmap database, an exact match of the Symbian OS was possible for both the Sony Ericsson P990i and the Nokia E61. Moreover, for the Sony Ericsson device the estimated effort to predict TCP sequence numbers and IP Id sequence numbers are given.
B. Vulnerability scanning
To perform vulnerability scanning, Nessus Server and Client [19] were used to scan the devices in order to find different ports and services running in the device. We have summarized the results regarding the smartphones' vulnerabilities in Table III. No significant vulnerabilities were reported by Nessus for any of the devices although it leaked information about the devices that could be useful for an attacker.
C. Penetration testing
In the penetration testing phase, we have performed many attacks against the target. The following paragraphs show the detailed results from these tests.
ARP spoofing
We observed that both targets are vulnerable against a denial-of-service attack when receiving a gratuitous ARP for its own IP address. The attack has been done in two ways.
The first attack was done using the target's own IP address but with a MAC address not belonging to the device in order to create an address conflict. In a second test, the attack was done with the target's own IP and MAC address with the intention to see if we could confuse the target. During these tests, we also observed that traffic can be hijacked between the target and router/access point using forged ARP request and reply packets.
We used the arpspoof tool from the dsniff 2.3 suite [20] and also packit [21] Table IV . 
TCP Syn flooding attack
Both smartphones turned out to be vulnerable against a well-known exploit, the Neptune or TCP SYN flooding attack [22] . Hping3 [23] was used to carry out this attack and we used the Linux machine as the attacking host in the WLAN environment. The results are shown in Table  IV .
The Sony Ericsson device cannot communicate with the AP while TCP SYN flooding is done towards open as well as closed ports. After running the attack for a while, it cannot connect to the AP at all and only a restart of the WLAN service in the device solves the problem. However, a SYN flooding attack towards open ports acts differently and the device starts to function again once the flooding is stopped. The Nokia device never experiences any problems during SYN flooding but it becomes very slow and unresponsive, for example while browsing the internet. In overall, the Nokia device acts smarter and handles TCP Syn flooding better than the Sony Ericsson device.
Other attacks
Some other historical attacks such as the Land attack, Ping of Death, Teardrop, Blat, Bonk, Boink, Naptha, Newtear, Opentear and Syndrop attacks were performed in order to test the network stack's stability and robustness. Moreover, a well-known exploit, the "IGMP V3 DoS vulnerability" [24] was tested by a real exploit tool [25] . These tests were successfully handled by both devices. Since the target device has a dual stack architecture (IPv4 and IPv6), Neighbor discovery spoofing was performed and was successfully handled by both devices. This is an attack where a malicious user conducts a spoofing attack through the Neighbor discovery protocol present in IPv6. The vulnerability discloses sensitive information and results in a DoS attack. The vulnerability is caused due to a bug in some implementations of the Neighbor discovery protocol while processing neighbor solicitation requests. It can be exploited by someone adding a faked entry to the neighbor's cache via an ND solicitation request, which may contain spoofed IPv6 address.
IV. LIMITATIONS
The tested Smartphones had no antivirus or firewall installed during the tests. A personal firewall or an IDS or IPS system on the device [27] may have stopped some of the vulnerabilities found here, but this has not been tested by us.
The tests mentioned in this paper have focused on the WLAN interface on these devices. Many smartphones today communicate not only using WLAN but also via GSM, GPRS and other more "phone-related" protocols as well as via Bluetooth and infra-red. All these protocols should also be tested in order to have a full picture of the device. The vulnerabilities found here are likely to be present on other interfaces as well since the same stack is most likely used to handle all IP-based traffic. However, this has not been verified by us in the tests performed here.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the stability and robustness of two popular Symbian-based Smartphones from two different vendors, Sony Ericsson and Nokia. We have carefully selected tools and attack methods in order to be as successful as possible in the tests. Both devices show similar behavior, although they are not identical due to vendor customization.
The tests have included some rather well-known attacks against vulnerabilities which used to be present in desktop operating systems like a DoS attack using ARP spoofing to the victim itself. Another successful test was session hijacking using forged ARP request and reply packets.
The devices were vulnerable and ceased to function and could not reliably communicate on the WLAN during a SYN DoS attack where the devices were flooded with SYN packets. The Sony Ericsson device even needed a restart to be functional even after the attack was stopped.
Both devices were also vulnerable against ARP spoofing. Sending unsolicited ARP replies to the Sony Ericsson device with its own MAC address, made it freeze after a short while. The only way to recover from this problem was to remove the battery.
Another problem occurred when unsolicited ARP replies were sent out using the devices IP addresses. The devices silently determined that there was a collision in IP addresses and therefore requested a new address using DHCP. An attacker sending an ARP message every other second would in reality make the network connection useless. Over time, the devices may also consume all available DHCP addresses and will not be able to obtain and IP address at all.
It was also possible to hijack the network traffic from the devices using faked ARP replies. This problem is perhaps somewhat expected but the devices could at least give a warning when a MAC or IP addresses suddenly change.
The Sony Ericsson device also had the Symbian broker service port open to the WLAN (we have not tested whether it is also accessible from a GPRS/3G network). This port enables other hosts to connect to the device and retrieve information from it. We have not verified that the service actually works, however the sheer presence of a listener on this port is bad and we see no reason to doubt that it also offers a service. The Nokia device did not have this port open to the network, which is the expected behavior.
The tests show that it is easy to spawn DoS attacks against Symbian based Smartphones. In an earlier paper [14] , we have shown that it was also possible to do similar, although different, attacks against Windows Mobile 5 devices with similar results where the devices were rendered useless.
When looking at the results from the tests, it seems that the network stack in Symbian-based devices contain several vulnerabilities and is not fully capable to operate in complex and hostile network environments such as on the Internet where hosts are constantly searched and scanned and many of these attacks are known to be constantly present [28] . We believe that these findings will be beneficial to the vendors, security researchers and practitioners and third party vendors who develop firewalls, antivirus, and intrusion detection systems for Smartphones. The work should also be useful for endcustomers and organizations who need to know what level of security and stability these devices offer. The results here should make it possible to know in what situations these devices should or should not be used.
